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ABSTRACT
We argue in this paper that retailers can strategically position store brands in product space
to strengthen their bargaining position when negotiating supply terms with manufacturers of national
brands. Using a bargaining framework we model a retailer's decision whether to carry an additional
national brand or a store brand, and if the retailer chooses to introduce the latter, where in product
space to locate the store brand. Store brands differ from other brands in being both unadvertised and
located at a position in product space that is determined by the retailer instead of by a manufacturer.
To capture the negotiation effect of store brands empirically, our paper analyses a retailer's choice
of whether or not to carry a store brand in a given category. We control for other motivations for
canying a store brand that have been used in the literature. We test our model on a cross-section of
categories using supermarket data from multiple retailers. The first contribution of this paper is to
show theoretically that the strategic positioning of a store brand in a category changes the bargaining
over supply terms between a retailer and national brand manufacturers in that category. The
empirical evidence is consistent with the theory. We find that retailers are more likely to cany a
store brand in a category if the share of the leading national brand is higher, but that the leading
national brand share does not affect the market share of the store brand. This indicates that there
may be a bargaining motive for the introduction of the store brand. We propose that this is because
the retailer can position the store brand to mimic the leading national brand and present data that
shows that store brands frequently imitate national brand packaging on multiple dimensions.
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Industry observers believe that the balance of power in the grocery channel has shifted in
recent years in favor of retailers. Practitioners and academics cite as evidence the growing
use of slotting allowances to obtain shelf space (Chu, 1992; Lariviere & Padmanabhan, 1997;
Shaffer, 1991), the surge in trade promotions (Gerstner & Hess, 1991; Lal, 1990; Lal, Little,
& Villas-Boas, 1996), and the proliferation of store brands ("private labels"). Store brands
account for about 14% of total U.S. and 20-30% of European supermarket sales (Quelch &
Harding, 1996; Steenkamp & Dekimpe, 1997).
While slotting allowances and trade promotions introduce new mechanisms of monetary
transfers between retailers and manufactures they preserve the basic distribution of roles in the
channel, namely that manufacturers produce products and retailers sell them. Store brands,
however, change the relation between retailers and manufacturers altogether by placing retailers
in a dual role as both manufacturers' immediate customers and as their competitors for end-
consumers' purchases.
The central idea of this paper is that retailers can strategically position store brands in
product space to strengthen their bargaining position when negotiating supply terms with
manufacturers of national brands. While there are other motivations for retailers to carry store
brands, retailers themselves list bargaining with manufacturers as one of the prime benefits
of introducing private labels in a category (from a 1993 PaineWebber retailing conference, see
Giblen (1993)). Our own conversations with store brand managers confirmed this finding.' We
set out to show theoretically and empirically that retailers can strategically use store brands
to better negotiate with manufacturers. In contrast, most of the recent empirical literature
has focused on the factors that determine the category share of store brands and hence their
success in the product market.2
Using a bargaining framework, we model a retailer's decision whether to carry an additional
national brand or a store brand, and if the retailer chooses to introduce the latter, where in
product space to locate the store brand. We show that by positioning the store brand to
mimic the leading national brand the retailer can strengthen its bargaining position when
negotiating supply terms with the manufacturer of the leading national brand. We show the
circumstances under which the retailer benefits from introducing the store brand in terms of
the retailer's relative bargaining power vis-a-vis manufacturers and measures of vertical and
horizontal differentiation.
1For example, a former high-level marketing executive for the Coca Cola company told us that Coca Cola
significantly lowered the wholesale price of its products in response to the introduction and aggressive shelf
placement of a premium store brand by a large supermarket chain.
2See Dhar and Hoch (1997), Hoch and Banerji (1993) for an example of this work.
2Our prediction that retailers may want to design their store brands to imitate a category's
leading national brand is confirmed by analyzing the 82 categories that were used in the em-
pirical part of this paper. We visited two stores belonging to the two largest chains in our
sample and recorded whether the store brand packaging imitated the packaging of a major na-
tional brand, and whether the store brand was displayed next to the imitated national brand.
We found that 65% (63%) of all store brands were placed next to a major national brand on
the shelf in the stores of chain 1 (chain 2). Further, 20% (15%) of store brands matched the
national brand in size, shape, color, lettering and art while 59% (52%) matched the national
brand in size, shape, and color. Of these imitative store brands between 70 and 80% were
placed next to the imitated store brand on the shelf. While imitation would be expected under
the bargaining hypothesis considered in this paper, retailers should not want to closely mimic
a national brand under the two most commonly held explanations for why retailers carry store
brands. Under these two alternative explanations, namely that store brands enable the retailer
to price discriminate and to earn higher price-cost margins than with national brands, the
retailer will benefit most when revenues are maximized, which should happen when the store
brand is differentiated from the national brand. These alternative explanations are considered
in section 4.
Empirically, the fact that store brands can both generate revenues for the retailer and serve
as a threat in negotiating supply terms with manufacturers introduces a difficulty in assessing
the strategic importance of store brands to the retailer. While the revenues a retailer earns
from store brands can be easily measured, it is empirically very difficult to determine how
store brands affect the supply terms negotiated between a retailer and a manufacturer. A
store brand represents a threat to the national brand in that the retailer could promote the
store brand through its circulars, advantageous displays, or price promotions, at the expense
of national brand sales. However such a threat need not be exercised in order to be effective at
extracting profit from the manufacturer, as long as it is a credible threat. As a result, neither
the market share of the store brand nor the price differential between national brand and store
brand are likely to be monotonically related to the strategic importance of store brands for
a retailer.3 In line with this argument, Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) have recently shown
that the equilibrium market share of a store brand may decrease and its price may increase
even as the store brand is functioning as an effective threat. From this they conclude that an
analysis based on store brand prices and market share alone, as has been used in the previous
literature that analyzes these two variables cannot easily illuminate the relationship between
3This argument has long been made in industrial organization; for example, it is well known that the threat
of entry in an industry can lead to product market behavior by a monopolistic incumbent that is consistent with
competition, even if entry does not occur in equilibrium (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982).
3the manufacturer and the retailer.
To capture the negotiation effect of store brands empirically, our paper analyzes instead a
retailer's choice of whether or not to carry a store brand in a given category. In doing so we
assume that store brands constitute a credible negotiating threat to manufacturers only once
they have been introduced, reflecting that retailers may have to incur a substantial fixed cost
to introduce a store brand. By examining the decision whether or not to carry a store brand,
instead of examining the category share attained by a store brand, our empirics both better
capture the strategic importance of store brands in retailer-manufacturer negotiations, and
also avoid the endogeneity problems inherent in previous empirical studies in which measures
of revenue or market share have been regressed on decision variables such as price differentials
and advertising.
We test retailers' use of store brands using recent supermarket data from nine grocery re-
tailers covering about 82 product categories. Our specification examines whether a store brand
exists in the category as a function of both category and store characteristics. Our main result
is that a retailer's likelihood of carrying a store brand in a particular category increases in the
market share of the leading national brand. This evidence is supportive of the bargaining model
which will be described in the next section. If we assume that a manufacturer's bargaining
power in a category increases with its brand's market share this implies that a store brand's
importance for a retailer increases with the relative bargaining power of the leading national
brand manufacturer. We exclude alternative explanations that may be driving this result.
To date we know of three papers that have looked at the role of store brands in enabling
retailers to strengthen their position vis-a-vis manufacturers. Mills (1995) argues that private
labels can allow retailers to capture part of the profit locked away by double marginalization
when manufacturers use simple linear pricing. Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) show that a
retailer that is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer from a monopolistic manufacturer can retain
some surplus by offering a store brand to consumers. This is because, while the store brand
offers less utility to consumers, its wholesale price is exogenously determined. In contrast, our
model endogenizes all pricing decisions, takes account of the fact that retailers can choose the
location of a store brand in product space, and relies on a bargaining framework. Krishnan and
Soni (1997) also discuss private label brands as a lever in manufacturer contracting. However,
their focus is on investigating when a "guarantee of margins" clause is likely to be accepted
by manufacturers. For an excellent discussion of other empirical and theoretical literature in
this area see Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998). The result that a firm may undertake strategic
actions to better negotiate with suppliers can also be found in related economics literature.
4We refer back in our results to previous empirical findings.
4Fontenay and Gans (1999) analyze tapered integration by manufacturers for its bargaining
properties vis-a-vis outside suppliers. Similarly, Gans and Stern (2000) show that vertical
integration of a portion of a firm's R&D may be sensible because it gives the firm a better
position from which to negotiate research contracts.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses brands and consumer heterogeneity.
Section 3 shows that by positioning the store brand to mimic the leading national brand the
retailer can strengthen its bargaining position. Section 4 discusses other motivations for why
a retailer may want to carry store brands. Section 5 introduces the empirical strategy used in
this paper. Section 6 presents the empirical results, and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Brands and consumers
To empirically examine why retailers may want to introduce store brands, it helps to understand
the distinction between store brands and other brands as well as why consumers may have
preferences for certain types of brands.
2.1 Brand types
We distinguish between two types of brands typically found in the grocery industry. First,
the brands of major manufacturers are generally referred to as "national brands." These
brands are supported by manufacturer advertising through mass media and are typically sold
and advertised across the US. Examples are "Tide," "Diet Coke," "Tostitos," "Kleenex," and
"Tropicana."
Second, we refer to "store brands" as brands that consumers associate with a retail chain
either because the brand name includes the retailer's name (such as "Safeway Select") or
because the brand is sold only at that retail chain. The crucial feature of a store brand in this
paper is that the retailer can choose the position of the brand in product space. That is, the
retailer can decide on the packaging and contents of the store brand (and can choose to closely
mimic a national brand, if desired.) Store brands are not advertised by retailers through mass
media, although retailers do highlight store brands in flyers and through in-store merchandising.
Retailers can carry more than one store brand in a category, for example, Safeway may sell
both corn flakes and bran cereal under the "Safeway Select" label. Alternatively, a retailer may
offer two store brands that differ in quality, for example, Star Market sells canned vegetables
under both its "Star" and "President's Choice" brands. The latter is sometimes referred to as
a "premium" store brand.5
"President's Choice" is a store brand that is of great interest to researchers because it is carried exclusively
5In most categories there are obviously more products than those that fit our definition
of national or store brand. We will refer to these as the "competitive fringe." The fringe
may function as a supply of potential contract producers for store brands, possibly allowing
a retailer to extract all rents from the store brand. Additionally, the fringe contains brands
without significant amounts of national or regional advertising, but which could be placed on
the shelf if the retailer needed to create more differentiation in the category. For example, in
the San Francisco Bay area Safeway carries "Padrinos" tortilla chips and "Rock Island" eggs
(based in Oakland and Petaluma respectively) 6Wewill not discuss the competitive fringe
further, except to remind the reader that those brands -andcompetition among them -may
create an outside supply option for the retailer.
Research into consumers' perceptions of brands suggests that brands fulfill at least two
important functions that are important in distinguishing between national and store brands
(Erdem et al., 1998). First, consumers may derive utility from the associations that advertising
creates with the brand name. For example, it is well established that the utility that consumers
derive from smoking "Marlboro" cigarettes stems in part from the brand association with
cowboy ideals. Marketing scholars have shown experimentally that consumers may derive
utility from the branded product that exceeds the utility they would derive from an identical
but unbranded product (Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1998). National brands are supported by the
type of mass media advertising necessary to create these additional consumption benefits, but
store brands are not. Except for some utility associated with advertising for the store as a
whole, store brands are therefore unlikely to provide consumers with any utility above and
beyond that derived from the physical product.8
The second function typically performed by brands is that the brand name may reduce
consumers' perceived risk of consuming the product. Since establishing a national brand re-
by one supermarket in a region and its products are as high quality as national brand products. Our model,
however, is not designed to reflect this type of store brand strategy. President's Choice is so good that adding
it to the category is just like adding anther national brand. The key characteristic of store brands we exploit in
our model is that the retailer can position the store brand exactly where it wants it in product space. This is
not true of President's Choice.
6Occasionally, regional brands are strongly advertised. For the purposes of our distinction they share more
similarities with national than fringe brands, hence we will subsume them under national brands. Examples in
the San Francisco Bay area include "Berkeley Farms" dairy products and "Semifreddi's" bakery products.
71n a famous marketing campaign in the 1980's Pepsi introduced the "Pepsi Challenge" to expose the fact
that consumers preferred Coke to Pepsi when they knew which product they were testing but preferred Pepsi to
Coke in a blind taste test.
8We offer two explanations store brands are not advertised through mass-media. First, it may be that the
store brand name —orany brand name that is used across many unrelated product categories —isill suited to
serve as an anchor for category specific associations created through advertising. Second, since store brands are
only sold in one retailer's stores whereas national brands are typically sold across many retailers, advertising by
national brand manufacturers may be much more efficient.
6quires a substantial, up-front fixed cost in the form of advertising, this expenditure serves as a
signal that the product is of a minimum quality. If the product were not of sufficient quality,
so the argument goes, the firm would not be able to recover the fixed cost of advertising to
establish and support the brand name (see Tirole (1988), pp. 118-119 for a discussion). By
this argument only national brands should reduce consumers' perceived risk of consumption
compared to unadvertised products. However, store brands can rely on a different mechanism
to guarantee quality, usually referred to in the literature as "umbrella branding" (Montgomery
& Wernerfelt, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1988). The argument here is that by using the same brand
name across many different products (in this case the name of the store across different cate-
gories), a retailer can put its reputation in many product categories at risk if it provides poor
quality in only one category. This increases the "punishment" that would follow a deviation to
poor quality and thus reduces consumers' perceived risk of consuming the store brand. Note
that fringe brands can rely on neither advertising nor umbrella branding to guarantee quality
and should thus be perceived by consumers to pose a greater risk at the time of consumption.















Table 1: Attributes of national and store brands
2.2 Consumer heterogeneity
The large variety of products offered in most categories indicates that consumers of grocery
retailers are heterogeneous in tastes and preference for quality. In addition, there is evidence
that consumers differ along at least two of the dimensions that differentiate national and store
brands. First, consumers vary in the utility that they derive from the brand associations
created through advertising. For example, sports stars and fashion images appeal differently
to different consumers.
Second, consumers vary in their aversion to unintentionally consuming a low quality product
(see Hawkins, Best, and Coney, Ch. 16). For example, a parent purchasing orange juice for
his small child may be more reluctant to purchase an unknown brand of orange juice if he is
concerned that it may have come from oranges heavily treated with pesticides. The degree to
which consumers are averse to an adverse consumption experience is likely to vary by product
category. For example, since the quality of a pain killer is hard to detect prior to consumption
7and the consequences of consuming a bad quality analgesic can range from unpleasant to
dangerous, we expect that most people will be very risk averse with regards to analgesics.9 In
contrast, we expect that consumers will not be risk averse with regards to bathroom tissue, for
example.
3 Store brand positioning as a retailer bargaining tool
In this section we develop a model that shows that retailers can use store brands to improve
their negotiating position vis-a-vis manufacturers. In recent years negotiating over supply terms
has become standard practice between retailers and manufacturers. Firms such as Walmart
and Krogers have used their power to pressure manufacturers into granting price concessions
(Stern, El-Ansary, & Coughlan, 1996) over both marginal payments (e.g., wholesale prices) and
over non-marginal payments (e.g, slotting allowances, cooperative advertising). Manufacturers
can no longer simply dictate their terms of sale.
The vertical relations literature has proposed an intuitive solution to a bargaining game be-
tween multiple parties that describes a situation in which manufacturers sell through a common
retailer. Most recently, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (1999) derive an equilibrium to a bargaining
game between two manufacturers and a retailer that is useful for understanding the role of
store brands in manufacturer-retailer negotiations.10
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the retailer negotiates contract terms
with each manufacturer, X and Y. In the second stage, the retailer chooses how much to buy
of products X and Y, and then resells these quantities to consumers. There are two bargaining
assumptions made. The first assumption is that bargaining between the retailer and firm i
results in maximization of the two players' joint profit, taking as given the retailer's contract
with firm j,ji. The second is that each firm earns its disagreement payoff plus a share of
the incremental gains from trade."
Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (1999) show that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation of
channel profits in the bargaining game. If ir, ir, and irdenotethe equilibrium profits of firm
9The share of brand name sales of over-the-counter pain relievers is very large despite a price premium over
generic products.
10Iyer and Villas-Boas (1998) also consider bargaining in a distribution channel by modelling a bilateral
monopoly between a single manufacturer and retailer. We cannot apply their model to our problem since our
argument relies on the externalities which are present when manufacturers compete in a common channel.
assumptions are consistent with the commonly used bargaining solutions (e.g., Nash bargaining, Ru-
binstein alternating offers bargaining, egalitarian bargaining, and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining) and with the
contract equilibrium concept of Cremer and Riordan (1987) and O'Brien and Shaffer (1992), and the pairwise-
proof equilibrium in McAfee and Schwartz (1994).





=— — ir, (3)
where isthe maximized profit that can be earned in the channel if both products are sold
to consumers (the "total channel profit"), and ll, (ll) is the maximized profit that can be
earned in the channel if only product X (Y) is sold (the "monopoly profit of the retailer and
firm X (Y)"). The result implies that, in equilibrium, isthe total profit to be divided
among the channel members, and that firm i earns proportion A. (representing its bargaining
power) of the the incremental profit contributed by its product. The incremental profit is
the difference between the total channel profit and the monopoly profit of the retailer and its
rival.'2 Intuitively, each manufacturer captures what is unique about its product, or something
proportional to that, depending on the manufacturer's bargaining power. If the manufacturers'
products are perfect substitutes, each manufacturer earns zero and the retailer can appropriate
the total channel profits. As the products become more differentiated (less substitutable), each
manufacturer's profit increases and the retailer's profit decreases.
To argue why retailers may want to introduce store brands we can use the simple insight
that each manufacturer can obtain as a payment from the retailer (at most) its incremental
contribution to total channel profits. We propose that the retailer can use a store brand to
decrease the incremental contribution of a national brand and thus improve its supply terms
with the national brand manufacturer. As shown in the introduction, we frequently observe
that store brands closely copy the package design of the leading national brand in the category,
suggesting to consumers that the store brand is a close substitute to the national brand. The
incremental contribution of the national brand decreases with an increase in the perceived
substitutability between the national brand and the store brand because if the manufacturer
of the national brand were to stop supplying its product, the loss in profits for a retailer that
carries a close substitute is comparatively small. This allows the retailer to extract profits from
the national brand manufacturer if it carries an imitation. 13
Wecan illustrate this point with a simple model. Suppose that brands can be "positioned"
12This insight can easily be extended to more than two products.
13This point distinguishes our paper from Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar (1995) who also discuss positioning
the store brand as a close substitute to the national brand. In our model the reasontheretailer would want to
make this choice is to extract channel profits from the manufacturer. Their model does not have this motivation
because there the retailer does not internalize pricing decisions of the national brands.
9to satisfy the tastes of one of two consumer segments, 1 and 2 with mass c and 1—cr, respectively.
A consumer in segment 1 that consumes a brand positioned for segment 2 enjoys only a fraction
'T E (0, 1) of the utility she would have enjoyed if she had consumed a brand positioned in
segment 1 and vice versa. In addition, brands can either be advertised or not where the cost of
advertising is assumed to be fixed, Fa > 0. We refer to advertised brands as national brands
and unadvertised brands as store brands. A consumer who consumes a store (unadvertised)
brand derives only a fraction s E (0, 1) of the utility she would from a consuming national
(advertised) brand in the same position. One may think of s as the degree to which a store
brand's perceived quality approaches the national brand and '7 as the degree to which a product
that was positioned for one segment is perceived by consumers as a good substitute for a
product that was positioned in the other segment. We assume that consumers do not all
value advertising the same; a consumer of type 0 that consumes a product positioned in her
own segment has utility 0 for a national brand and utility s 0 for a store brand where 0 is
distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. Following the definition of segments, the same consumer would
have utility '7 0 for a national brand in the other segment, and utilitys 0 for a store brand in
the other segment. Finally, we assume zero marginal cost of production, implying that there
is no difference in the marginal cost of producing a national and a store brand.
k/i. We introduce the following notation: ll is the maximum profit that can be earned in the
channel in total if i's product is in segment k and j's product is in segment h. The capital
letter notation represents the profit of a vertically and horizontally integrated monopolist that
manufactures and sells all products. The maximum profit the retailer can earn is
(where i, j{x, y, s}, k, h E [1, 2}). Subscripts x and y refer to manufacturers X and Y,
respectively, and subscript s refers to the store brand manufacturer. Analogously, ll is the
maximized profit that can be earned in the channel if firm i positions its product in segment k
and only this product is sold by a fully integrated monopolist.
The retailer's problem is as follows: he is currently carrying a national brand from manu-
facturer X that is positioned for the larger of the two consumer segments which we will define
to be segment 1 (c E (1/2, 1]). We will refer to this brand as the "leading national brand."
The retailer has shelf space for exactly two brands. He needs to decide which brand to add,
a second national brand or a store brand. We assume that national brand manufacturer Y
chooses the positioning of the second national brand and the retailer chooses the positioning
of the store brand.'4
14Here the existence of the competitive fringe is important for understanding our choice of the retailer's
problem. Notice that in the absence of technological barriers to entry there is no shortage of differentiated
brands for the retailer to place on the shelf. If a category with a limited number of national brands would be
more profitable with another differentiated product, the retailer has many products to choose from. In contrast
to the previous literature, the retailer does not need to introduce a store brand solely to get another product on
10Before proceeding with the presentation of the model, it is important to note that, while we
believe that retailers carry store brands for multiple reasons, this model rules out other retailer
incentives to carry store brands in order to clearly identify the bargaining motivation. These
alternative reasons will be discussed in section 4 and in the empirical work. In particular, in the
model all consumers prefer national brands to store brands, demands are linear and production
has zero marginal cost, which implies that store brands do not serve to price discriminate within
each consumer segment. The per unit profits the retailer realizes from selling the national brand
is high enough that he has no incentive to try to attract consumers to the store brand instead.
Formally, for each consumer segment, a fully integrated monopolist does not benefit from
introducing a store brand at the same position in product space as an existing national brand;




Proof: Immediate from profit expressions in the Appendix.
To exclude a further explanation why a retailer may want to introduce a store brand, we
assume that the manufacturer of the store brand has the same bargaining power as the national
brand manufacturers (A =A=A3A) 15Thisbiases our results against a retailer's incentive
to carry a store brand and thus illuminates the bargaining motivation.
We now show that whether the retailer prefers to carry a second national brand or a store
brand depends on the bargaining power of the manufacturers. For now we assume that the
retailer would position a store brand in segment 1, and manufacturer Y would position a second
national brand in segment 2 (we will show later that these assumptions in fact hold). We can
now state the main proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the incremental contribution of the leading national brand to total
channel profits is lower when the retailer carries a store brand than when the retailer carries a
second national brand: n4' —ll<n4', —ll
the shelf. Hence, our key concern is not whether the retailer should introduce an additional brand, instead we
ask which type of additional brand the retailer should want to carry.
15An interpretation of this is that the store brand is not "cheaper to acquire" than a national brand. It might
be more realistic for many product categories to assume that the manufacturer of the store brand has little or
no bargaining power=0),an assumption we would make if the market for store brands were competitive.
For example, in the absence of technological barriers one might think of the industry represented by the fringe
brands as a market in which the retailer can contract for a store brand. Because there is competition between the
many existing and potential fringe brands in the market, there is no economic rent to be earned from providing
the store brand. The main results do not differ between the two cases. We highlight below a change in one of
the minor conclusions.
11Then, there exists a A E (0, 1) such that for all A > A the retailer prefers to introduce a
store brand to a second national brand.
Proof: Let A =1.It follows that ir')>ii-(4',)
—ll< —llwhich holds by
assumption. Let A =0.Using Lemma 1 we can write > ll4 > ll =
whichholds by Lemma 2 in the appendix. Then by continuity of irQ) — thereexists a
A E (0, 1) such that for all A> A, ir(4') > Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the proposition says that if the store brand is a closer substitute than the second
national brand to the leading national brand, then when manufacturer bargaining power is high,
the retailer will want to introduce the store brand. Carrying the store brand will most reduce the
manufacturer's incremental contribution, counteracting high manufacturer bargaining power.
Although total channel profits would always be higher if the retailer were to offer two national
brands instead of one store and one national brand, when manufacturer bargaining power is
high, the retailer would not be able to retain a large share of that increased surplus.'6 If
manufacturer bargaining power is very low, then the retailer will be able to collect most of the
profits from the channel and will introduce the other national brand. Note that the introduction
of a store brand increases the retailer's profits through a pure redistribution of channel profits,
not through a price discrimination effect.
It is easy to find examples in the parameter space (ci, 'r, s) for which the incremental
contribution of the leading national brand to total channel profits is lower when the retailer
carries a store brand than when the retailer carries a second national brand. For example, this
is the case for all (ci, r, s) E Q where Q ={c,r, s 0 <r < 0< s < 1, 1/2 < c < i}.'
In general, the less differentiated the two national brands are (higher 'j, the higher quality a
store brand must be (higher s) in order for a retailer with low bargaining power to prefer to
carry it18
Note that dropping the national brand from the shelf is a very strong threat. To make the
argument somewhat less dramatic and perhaps more realistic, we can instead let the retailer
threaten to aggressively promote its mimicking store brand at the expense of the national brand,
rather than drop the national brand.'9 This situation is still consistent with the argument
above; in both cases the retailer has improved its disagreement payoff. When it carries a store
brand that is an imitation of the national brand, the retailer has better profit opportunities in
cases when negotiations do not lead to a beneficial agreement to promote the national brand.
16For a discussion of efficiency see page 15.
17See the appendix for a proof
18This describes the case for i-
executive we spoke to indicated that his chain did drop national brands from the shelf for a few days
when negotiations went particularly badly.
12As noted in the introduction, an important underlying assumption in this argument is that the
existence on the shelf of the store brand is what makes the retailer's threat credible. While the
retailer can threaten to obtain and market a store brand in the future, we claim that this type
of threat is not as powerful, and will have less impact on the manufacturer's behavior, than
when the store brand already exists. This is because the retailer must pay a fixed cost and
endure some delay before the store brand appears on the shelf. If it were effective, the retailer
would like to threaten to carry store brands, but never actually do so. Already having a store
brand is the credible commitment that changes the bargaining game.
The immediate question following this argument is why a retailer cannot introduce a second
national brand that is a very close substitute to the target national brand. Since there is always
an element of vertical differentiation between a national and a store brand (due to the difference
in advertising), one might think that a second national brand could potentially be a much better
substitute for the targeted national brand, allowing the retailer to improve its supply terms
even further. To understand why this is unlikely to occur it is helpful to revisit one of the
fundamental differences between national brands and store brands, namely, that the location
in product space of a national brand is controlled by its manufacturer while the location in
product space of a store brand is controlled by the retailer. While the retailer should want
to introduce a close substitute to the target national brand, the manufacturer of the second
national brand is less inclined to position its product as a close substitute to the target national
brand. This is captured in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Firm Y will not position its brand in segment 1.
Proof: Suppose firm Y did position its brand in segment 1. From (2) we know that=
(ri', —n).Since consumers derive the same utility from X and Y, =llHence,
=0< Fa and firm Y is better off not offering its national brand. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, if Firm Y positions its product in the same segment as the existing leading
national brand, its incremental contribution, and therefore its profits are zero; in other words,
there are no economic rents in producing homogeneous products. As a result, the manufacturer
of a national brand has little incentive to produce a close substitute to another national brand.
Thus, the very condition that makes another national brand in segment 1 useful to the retailer,
namely that it makes Firm X's incremental contribution zero, also makes Firm Y not want to
introduce its brand in segment 1 because its incremental contribution will also be zero.
Alternatively, one might ask whether the retailer might prefer to introduce the store brand
in segment 2:
Proposition 3 The retailer will not position the store brand in segment 2.
13Proof: Suppose the retailer did position its store brand in segment 2. Using (3) we know
=— A(ll'—ll)
—A(ll'
—ll).If the retailer were to introduce its store brand
in segment 1 or introduce the second national brand (which by Proposition 2 is only offered in
segment 2) its profits would be ir(') =— A(ll'—ll)
—A(ll'
—ll)and ir(',) =
— A(ll',—ll) —A(ll',—ll), respectively. Simple algebraic manipulation using Lemma 1
shows that for ll > ll and ll > ll, ir(') > ir(4') if A > 1/2 and ir(',) > ir(4') if
A < 1/2. ll > ll and ll > ll hold by Lemma 2 in the appendix. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When manufacturers have less than half of the
bargaining power (A < 1/2), the retailer benefits (ceteris paribus) from an increase in total
channel profit. To see this, consider the retailer's profit when offering two national brands:
*11,2 fll,2 —ip12—— ip12—[fl 7rr'x,y)
—x,y' x,y y)' x,y x
= AII+ AII + (1 —2A)ll (7)
Given that a store brand located at segment 2 increases total channel profits less than the second
national brand and is not "cheaper to acquire" (A =As),the retailer prefers the national
brand.2° When each manufacturer has more than half of the bargaining power (A> 1/2), the
retailer benefits (ceteris paribus) from a decrease in total channel profit since this decreases the
sum of both manufacturers' incremental contribution by more than total channel profits. Given
that a store brand located at segment 1 does not increase total channel profits but lessens the
incremental contribution of firm X, the retailer prefers to position the store brand at segment 1.
Finally, one might ask why the retailer could not introduce one of the fringe brands as a
close substitute to the national brand. The same argument as for the national brand applies.
The better the fringe brand substitutes for the national brand, the lower the incremental
contribution that the manufacturer of the fringe brand can appropriate. Since economic profits
are earned through differentiation, it is only in the retailer's interest, not in any manufacturer's,
to have an almost exact imitation of an existing product on the shelf. In addition, the fringe
brand will be a less good substitute than a store brand due to difference in the degree to which
the brands can guarantee quality.
How much the retailer can gain by an improved negotiating position depends on the extent
to which store brands can lower the incremental contribution of the national brands. In line
20Note that the result in this proposition need not hold if we assume that the store brand manufacturer has
no bargaining power ( =0).This is because while the store brand increases total channel profits less than the
second national brand, its costs to the retailer are lower. One can show that for intermediate ) (of manufacturers
X and Y), the retailer may be best off introducing the store brand in segment 2. However, the result remains
that for large \ the retailer prefers to introduce the store brand in segment 1.
14with the model formulation we focus on the leading national brand:
Proposition 4 Suppose the retailer prefers introducing a store brand to a second national
brand. Then, the higher the manufacturers' bargaining power (A)andthe larger the segment
of consumers that favor the leading national brand (ci), the more the retailer benefits from
introducing a store brand.
Proof: Applying the assumption that each manufacturer earns its disagreement payoff plus a
share A of the incremental gains from trade to bilateral bargaining between the retailer and
manufacturer X, the retailer's gain from carrying a store brand in addition to the leading
national brand is Air = — (1—A)ll.Using Lemma 1, Air =AilS'.Hence,r=
il> 0. From Lemma 2 we know that= A> 0. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the retailer will benefit most from introducing a store brand when total profits
from selling the leading national brand is high (large )andwhen Firm X captures a large
share of those profits (large A). Considering that in this model of discrete segments, c proxies
for market share of the leading national brand we hypothesize that in the empirical analysis,
all else equal, the larger the category share of the leading national brand, the more likely will
be a retailer to carry a store brand.
Efficiency in product choice
This model predicts that the retailer may want to introduce a store brand even if doing so
decreases total channel profits. This implies that the product choice of the retailer can be
inefficient. This inefficiency disappears if we think of the bargaining game as the second stage
of a game in which manufacturers first contract for shelf placement with the retailer. If man-
ufacturers can make make side payments in the first stage in exchange for binding contracts
that guarantee shelf placement of their products, in equilibrium the retailer will always carry
and promote the products that maximize total channel profits.2'
The expanded game underlines an argument we have made in the introduction, namely that
the market share of the store brand is a poor indicator for the strategic importance of the store
brand for the retailer. To make this argument, suppose that there are cases in which carrying
the store brand may lead to higher total channel profits than carrying the second national
brand.22 Now suppose that manufacturers have all the bargaining power (A =A=A5=1)
and that the retailer needed to decide whether to carry a store brand in segment 1 or a second
21We would like to thank Birger Wernerfelt for raising this point.
22This means that the store brand mayserveto price discriminate within each consumer segment —amotivation
we explicitly excluded in deriving the bargaining motivation in order not to confound it with a possible price
discrimination motivation (see section 4.1).
15national brand. In the absence of shelf placement contracts the retailer will carry the store
brand instead of the second national brand if
ll —ll<ll —ll. (8)
In the expanded game we have argued that the retailer will carry the store brand instead of
the second national brand if
ll > (9)
If (8) and (9) hold, the expanded game predicts that the retailer will carry the store brand
in equilibrium and benefit from the (exercised) threat to carry a store brand. In fact, store
brands are the market share leader in about 20% of categories.23 If (8) holds but (9) does
not, the retailer will carry both national brands, but only because one or both national brand
manufacturers will compensate the retailer in the first stage to make up for the fact that in the
second stage the retailer is worse off carrying the second national brand instead of the store
brand. The expanded game predicts in this case that the retailer will not generate revenues
from the store brand in equilibrium but nonetheless benefits from the (now unexercised) threat.
For the empirical analysis our predictions as to when we should observe the retailer carrying
store brands continue to hold in the expanded game, since we have argued that the on-the-shelf
existence of the store brand is what makes the retailer's threat credible. Hence, if the retailer
prefers to carry a store brand, but category profits increase more as a result of introducing
another national brand, we expect the retailer to be compensated by national brand manufac-
turer(s) for carrying and promoting that national brand. The store brand will nonetheless be
introduced to serve as a credible threat but might be relegated to a shelf near the floor and
priced relatively high.24
23We would like to thank Sanjay Dhar for pointing this out to us.
24The managers we spoke with claimed that there were no explicit contracts of the type "the retailer will not
carry (promote) a store brand in return for good supply terms from the national brand." The reason might be
that the manufacturer-retailer relationship is characterized by repeated interaction in a long-term relationship
where negotiations are frequent due to changes in demand, cost, product range, promotions, market structure,
etc. In this setting one might expect that cooperative agreements can be sustained without formal contracts. In
the supermarket, it is easy for one party to see if the other is behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with an
informal understanding, and supply terms can be renegotiated. For example, a retailer could lower the price of
its store brand, place it on the shelf next to the national brand, and add a large "compare and save" sign to the
shelf. This type of action might cause a national brand to alter co-promotional agreements with the retailer or
to change its pricing structure.
164 Other retailer incentives to carry store brands
The focus of this paper is to introduce theoretically and empirically the imitative use of store
brands as a bargaining tool for retailers. Indeed, the model we have presented so far has been
explicitly constructed to be driven solely by the bargaining motivation. However, as we move
to the empirical results, it will be important to keep in mind empirically control for other
motivations for retailers to carry store brands. We therefore discuss briefly three other such
motivations.
4.1 Store brands allow the retailer to price discriminate between consumers
Differences among consumers in the utility that they derive from the brand associations created
through advertising and in their aversion to unintentionally consuming a low quality product
can be exploited by retailers to second degree price discriminate among consumers through
national, store, and fringe brands. Such discrimination may increase total channel profits, even
if there are no cost differences to the retailer in selling the three types of brands. Consumers that
derive high utility from the brand associations created through advertising should self select
into national brands. Consumers that derive low utility from these brand associations but have
a strong aversion to unintentionally consuming a low quality product, should self select into
store brands. Consumers that care neither about brand associations from advertising nor are
very risk averse should purchase a brand from the competitive fringe. Thus the assortment of
brands that best price discriminates among consumers (and therefore maximizes total channel
profits) is likely to differ with the distribution of consumer types.
This does not mean that the retailer is most likely to introduce a store brand when doing
so most effectively price discriminates. This is because whether a retailer benefits from an
increase in total channel profits depends on its bargaining power vis-a-vis manufacturers. To
see this, suppose that, in contrast to the model in section 3, the store brand did serve to price
discriminate, i.e. that total channel profits from selling the store brand and the national brand
in segment 1 exceeded the profits from selling only the national brand, ll4' >ll.All else
equal, the better the store brand is at price discriminating, the higher are total channel profits
ll4'. Now consider the retailer's profits when carrying the leading national brand and the store
brand in segment 1:
=All+ A3ll +(1
—— A3)ll (10)
Noticethat whether the retailer benefits from an increase in total channel profits depends
on the bargaining power of the store brand (A3) and the leading national brand (Ar). For
17example, suppose the store brand manufacturer had no bargaining power (A =0).Then the
retailer benefits if the store brand better price discriminates because she can appropriate a part
of the increase in total channel profits. If the store brand manufacturer had as much bargaining
power as the national brand (A =A)and A, were greater than 1/2, the manufacturers could
appropriate more than the full amount of any increased ability by the store brand to price
discriminate and the retailer would consequently be worse off.
Thus, if a retailer has shelf space constraints and/or incurs fixed cost by introducing an
additional brand, the incentive of a retailer to carry store brands is likely to be a function
of both the distribution of consumer types and manufacturers' bargaining power. For the
empirical analysis we conjecture that in most product categories the manufacturers of store
brands have little bargaining power. This captures a situation in which the market for store
brands is quite competitive (see footnote 15 for a discussion).
Based on these arguments we expect to find that, all else equal, a retailer is less likely to
carry the store brand in a product category in which more consumers derive some utility from
the brand associations created through advertising. For example, we expect that a retailer is
less likely to carry a store brand in the cigarette category than in the sugar category.
With respect to risk aversion we expect to find that, all else equal, a retailer is more likely
to carry a store brand in a product category in which more consumers are only moderately
averse to unintentionally consuming a low quality product. For example, a retailer could be
less likely to carry store brands in the infant formula category because the store name is an
insufficient guarantee of quality to consumers. On the other hand, the quality certification
provided by the store's name might make it worth carrying a store brand in the analgesics
category as compared to the bathroom tissue category, where consumers may be more willing
to purchase an unknown brand.
4.2 The retailer can take advantage of the marginal —averagecost gap
The advertising required to support national brands implies that national brand manufacturers
have average costs that are substantially higher than their marginal costs of production. Since
in the long run manufacturers will not supply their products below average cost, the gap
between marginal and average cost of national brand manufacturers allows retailers to achieve
higher per unit profits selling a store brand than selling a national brand with similar marginal
costs of production. Industry observers, the popular press, and academic work all indicate that
this effect can be quite large (loch & Banerji, 1993). However, it is important to remember
that manufacturers often provide services to the retailer (inventory, promotions, shelf-stocking,
etc.) for "free." As noted in Corstjens and Lal (2000) the retailer has to perform and pay
18for these services in the case of its own store brand, a fact which should not be omitted when
calculating profitability of each type.
We have argued in the previous subsection that a retailer may want to use a store brand
to price discriminate between heterogeneous consumers. In other words, depending on the
distribution of consumer tastes, the retailer will want to set prices that induce some consumers
to self-select into each type of brand. If retailer price-cost margins are higher on store brands
than on national brands, the retailer may have an additional incentive to carry a store brand
beyond the price discrimination and bargaining incentive.
One might argue that since a fringe product is also not saddled with high average costs due to
advertising, a retailer could just as well increase its price-cost margin by selling an attractively
priced fringe brand. However, a store brand may be more highly valued by consumers that
are averse to unexpectedly consuming low quality. Hence, a store brand is more suitable as a
means of attracting some consumers that would purchase a national brand in the absence of
an unadvertised alternative.
Despite the attraction of higher price-cost margins, a retailer should not aim to completely
substitute store brands for national brands since the retailer depends on national brands to
serve consumers that derive utility from the brand associations created by advertising. In ad-
dition, one can argue that in certain product categories only national brands can effectively
communicate a location in product space (by advertising), a location that store brands fre-
quently imitate.
Since the price-cost margin that a retailer can achieve from selling a store brand is related
to the marginal —averagecost differential of national brand manufacturers, we expect to find
that, all else equal, the larger the fixed cost associated with supporting a national brand, the
more likely a retailer is to carry a store brand.
4.3Economiesof Scale
Conditional on the retailer having an incentive to use store brands to increase its profits
(through an improved negotiating position, price discrimination, and higher retailer price-cost
margins), the fixed cost associated with introducing a store brand means that a retailer is more
likely to want to do so if the absolute size of the potential gains from the store brand are larger.
We therefore expect to find that, all else equal, the larger the revenues in a category, the more
likely is a retailer to carry a store brand.
195 Empirical Strategy
Relationships between retailers and manufacturers in the supermarket industry are very com-
plex. In addition to a wholesale price that may be a function of volume, there are promo-
tions, co-promotions, inventory services, shelf-stocking services, and slotting fees that transfer
resources back and forth between the two parties. Data on the monetary flows in these relation-
ships are extremely hard to find, and are almost useless to a researcher unless they are complete.
Thus when we empirically implement our hypothesis, we will not focus on one measure such as
the wholesale-retail margin to summarize the surplus accruing to each party.25 Although we
would prefer to measure the overall profitability of a category and relate that to the adoption of
a store brand, we cannot use this approach because of the complexity of measuring profitability.
Instead we will analyze the simple dichotomous choice of whether the retailer carries the store
brand or not. We assume that in making that choice, the retailer is acting to maximize its own
profits, and therefore categories with store brands are more profitable than they would have
been without those brands.
The empirical model assumes that there is some net profit associated with introducing
a store brand into a category. This profit depends on the incremental benefits and costs of
supplying the store brand. When the net benefit is sufficiently high, the researcher observes
the dichotomous choice "enter." Otherwise, there is no store brand in the category. Because of
the observed discrete choice, we will use a probit functional form. The benefits included in our
model will be demand measures such as demographics, category size (because of the fixed costs
of entry), the average-marginal cost gap of national brands in the category, and bargaining.
Costs include the difficulty of finding a supplier, and store and chain dummies that proxy for
organizational features like official store brand programs and store brand managers. The error
in the regression represents unmeasured or unobserved costs or benefits of introducing a store
brand in the category for that organization. Examples might include local tastes, an usually
convenient supplier, or retailer dislike of a particular brand representative.
5.1 Data
We use supermarket data originally collected by IRI from consumers and stores in a large
mid-Western US city.26 We exploit primarily the rich cross-sectional variation in the data;
it contains 5 organizations (chains), 9 stores, and information on 82 categories for each store
over two years, from June 1991 to June 1993. (We refer to this time period as 1991 and
1992, although the data for a year include the last 6 months of a year and the first 6 months
25This has been used in other studies such as Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998).
26Other research using this dataset includes Bell and Lattin (1998) and Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998)
20of the next.) The data track over one thousand households and over one hundred and fifty
thousand shopping trips. We are not primarily interested in the household-level data, but
make limited use of it by constructing demographic information for the stores in the sample.
Rather than calculate statistics that describe the existing customers of each store, we instead
draw neighborhoods (a radius) around each store and calculate mean values of the available
characteristics for that population.
We form averages of demographic variables that have proven important in previous studies:
age, income, percent non-white, occupational category, and family size.27 In the data, occupa-
tional category is coded as one of several different types of job. For each adult with job type
"managerial" or "professional" we give the household a one. Then these scores are averaged
across households in the radius of the store to create a variable measuring the abundance of
professional consumers. We also have a variable that indicates if there are young children in the
household (under 11). Its mean by store area is strongly correlated with family size mean (.85)
and we find that exchanging the two in the empirical work makes no difference to the results.
Thus, we use family size and interpret it as mostly representing the presence of children.
The product categories we use follow the IRI definitions (we typically use IRI "type" which
is a more detailed subset of a category). Each item is described in detail in the dataset:
category, name, size, market share, and manufacturer. We categorize an item as a store brand
if its manufacturer is listed as "Private Label." The dataset does not distinguish the type of
private label, therefore we cannot tell if a product is Presidents' Choice or Jewel brand cookies.
With regards to "premium" store brands this is not a major drawback for our sample period
since premium store brands have become important only in the last few years. Our dependent
variable expresses whether the number of store brands in a given category is nonzero or zero.
About 54 percent of observations (category-store-years) have at least one store brand present.
The largest variation is across categories; approximately 10% of categories have no store brand
regardless of the store, chain, or year they belong to. Similarly, about 10% of categories always
have a store brand. The mean percentage of categories with store brands varies less across
chains. In our data the highest level is 65% and the lowest is 40%. Only 6% of category-stores
have different values of the dependent variable across years. Within a chain there is a little
variation across stores. About 5% of chain-categories carry a store brand in only a subset of
stores in the chain. We find that there is on average a 26% difference between the maximum
and minimum number of "Private Label" UPCs carried by stores in a single chain (omitting
the chain with only one store.) This indicates that there is surprising variability in store brand
27Previous research such as Cotterill, Dhar, and Putsis (1997) and Dhar and Hoch (1997) has found that
education, age, and lack of wealth increase the share of private labels.
21strategy at the store level.
However, because a store manager can only stock a store brand product which the chain has
invested in acquiring, the credible threat discussed in the model section is primarily exercised
at the chain level. On the other hand, the store manager does not have to carry a store
brand and has some local control over promotion, shelf allocation, and price-setting. The store
manager may also be able to independently source a broker label such as "Country's Delight"
that does not have the chain's name on it. Although we do not address this point in the paper,
the implication of our model is that the most effective (profitable) organizations will be those
where supply terms with the national brand are negotiated with the part of the organizational
hierarchy that decides how to source and position a named store brand. Because the chain-level
decisions are most interesting to us, we create a chain-level dependent variable that takes a one
if any of the stores in that chain carry a store brand in that category and zero otherwise.
We model causality in the following way. We assume that the national market structure in
year t causes a store (or chain) to develop a store brand to improve its bargaining situation, or
not. The store is unable to offer the store brand to consumers until some time after it decides it
wants the product because it has to find an appropriate supplier, decide on the characteristics
of the product, give the supplier time to make investments, test the quality of the product,
etc. Because of the data we have, we use a four-year lag between the measurement of market
structure and the observation of the store brand. While this is likely to be somewhat longer
than a store needs to source and refine a store brand, we are more concerned to avoid too
short a period. The reason is that the sale of store brands will affect structural features of the
market over time, whereas we want to focus on the reverse causality: the structural features
determining the likelihood of the store carrying a store brand. In particular, a popular leading
brand may attract a store brand, which then erodes the market share of that leading brand. If
so, a researcher looking at market structure after the store brand has achieved success will not
see a relationship between leading brand market share and store brand introduction.
Our independent variables come from national, not store level, data, in the year 1987.
This allows the measures to pre-date the store's choice of store brand in 1991 through 1993.28
Because there is no "start date" when supermarkets were allowed to introduce store brands
(as there is in the pharmaceutical industry due to patents, for example), it is impossible to
choose an initial year in which market structure does not reflect any effect of store brands.
However, the late 80s is a relatively good baseline because it was a time of prosperity (when
there is relatively less emphasis on store brands), while our store brand data come from the
course, the market share of the leading national brand in a particular store in 1991 will affect store brand
choice in 1991, but only because it is correlated with leading national brand share in previous years. If we
included the current data, the information it would add would predict store brand choice in subsequent years.
22years in, and immediately following, a recession when more retailers focused on store brands.
In addition, some industry observers claim there was a one-time shift toward store brands in
the 90's because of their continued popularity despite a strong expansion.29 In any case, if
the existence of store brands in the late 80s changed market structure (ie. eroded the share of
the leading national brand) it will only weaken our results; we would find that some categories
have store brands, but these categories do not look different from other categories since the
previously strong leading brand has been weakened.
Ideally, we would like to include the market share of the leading brand in the supermarket in
question in 1987 as an explanatory variable for stocking a store brand. Clearly this measure is
an important element driving store decisions. However, we do not have that data. The national
data, while not reflecting local conditions, are an average of local conditions and also provide
data on the store's options beyond what it might be carrying currently, which also affect its
incentives.
From the IRI Marketing Factbook of 1987, we recorded the market share of the leading
brand in the category, the total number of brands in the category, and the category revenue
per one thousand households. From the survey of Leading National Advertisers (LNA) we
collect advertising dollars (in thousands) for seven media they track (network TV, cable TV,
other TV, network radio, newspapers, magazines, outdoor media). These advertising outlays
are brand specific at quite a detailed level, so we were able to make sure the advertising data
and the revenue data were collected for the same product. Our last variable is somewhat less
official in origin, as it is the result of a survey conducted on MBA students at the University of
Chicago. We wanted to get a sense of consumers' attitudes toward risk and felt that a survey
was the best way to measure consumer preferences across categories. Students from several
classes filled out a questionnaire that asked them to rate each of our categories on the question,
"How likely is it that you might unknowingly pick a poor quality product in this category?"
and asked them to indicate if they regularly buy products in that category. They answered
the question for each category with a rating from 1 to 5, with the endpoints being described
as "not at all likely" and "very likely." Omitting incomplete surveys, we take the mean of 141
student answers for each category and form a variable that indicates when consumers feel they
lack the information to choose a quality product. We only use the responses of students who
regularly purchase in the category as it turns out this is a more powerful explanatory variable
than the total mean. Finally, for each store, chain, and year, we form dummy variables to
control for any unmeasured differences —constantto those units —intheir propensity to carry
a store brand.
29Progressive Grocer, January 1990, page 75 and Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), page 573.
235.2 Specification
Several of our conjectures posit a potentially non-monotonic relationship between the variable
and the profitability of a store brand. For example, advertising should create a wedge between
average and marginal cost that makes the category attractive to a store brand, but at some
point, the advertising of the national brand might become so effective at creating a valued image
that it is no longer worth introducing a store brand. Therefore, we include an advertising-to-
sales ratio of the leading national brand as well as dummy variables that indicate whether
the ratio is in the top or bottom quintile of the distribution. This specification is especially
important because the advertising-to-sales ratio has significant range: the bulk of the categories
are close to zero, but the ratio ranges all the way up to two. (Recall that units are advertising
dollars in thousands to revenues per one thousand households.) This large range seems to
indicate measurement error of some kind, perhaps made worse by the construction of the ratio
of two variables. However, the data sources for advertising and revenues are the best available
and are standard sources in the literature, so there is no better alternative. The dummy
variables for high and low quintiles mitigate the effect of the extreme values of the advertising
to sales ratio. Note that we use the advertising to sales ratio to avoid mistakenly associating
store brands with large advertising expenditures when the relationship is actually with large
categories.
We might expect the effect of economies of scale in introducing a store brand to taper off
once a category reaches a sufficiently large size. Therefore category revenue is included in both
a linear and a squared form.
The previous literature often includes the number of manufacturers and/or the number of
national brands in the category as an explanatory variable in predicting either store brand
share or the existence of a store brand (See Raju et al. (1995) and Dhar and Hoch (1997)). In
these models the number of manufacturers in the category is likely to be picking up some of the
effects of bargaining in the following way. If there are only a few national manufacturers, they
may be able to extract more profit from the category. Therefore the retailer has more incentive
to improve its bargaining position and, coincidentally, the category contains a few, large share
products. All else equal, we expect higher concentration -fewermanufacturers -togive the
retailer an incentive to introduce the store brand. In our study, however, we have controlled for
the market share of the leading national brand. Thus we can use the number of manufacturers
in the category to provide information about supply conditions rather than bargaining power.
The more manufacturers are actively producing national brands in the category, the less likely
it is that there are intellectual property barriers to entry, and the more likely the store can easily
find a manufacturer for its store brand. Therefore we expect that the number of manufacturers
24in the market, conditional on the share of the leading brand, will positively affect the probability
of a store brand in the category. The number of manufacturers in a category ranges from 1 to
47. In our specification, we include the number of manufacturers as a continuous variable as
well as dummies for large and small categories in case the relationship is nonlinear: markets
with more than 24 manufacturers and markets with fewer than 4 manufacturers are allowed
additional coefficients.
Finally, we include the interaction between the advertising to sales ratio and the share of
the leading brand as an additional explanatory variable. Categories where the leading national
brand has been spending a lot on advertising and has also been very successful in generating
market share are likely to be categories with some kind of genuine innovation or national brand
capability. There are no category dummy variables in the specification (not enough degrees of
freedom), so we include the interaction term as the best way to measure successful advertising.
These categories are less likely to be profitable for the store brand because it will be difficult
for the store product to become an effective substitute for the national brand.
Restricting the sample to complete observations leaves us with 1210 observations at the
store-category level (640 first year, 570 second year) and 728 at the chain-category level (366,
362). Summary statistics are contained in Tables 2 and 3. The probit model we estimate is
Pr(Store Brand0) = + 32X0 +/33Year) (11)
where the dependent variable is a one in each category-organization-year (c, o, y) if a store brand
exists and is zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are divided into three matrices according
to the dimension described, category, organization, or year.
6 Results
The results are presented in tables 6, 7, and 8 on pages 38 through 40. There is variation in
both demographics and in the stocking of store brands within a chain, so we begin by focusing
on the decision at the store level. In Table 6, we use the entire sample and estimate two
different specifications, one with store and chain dummy variables and one with demographic
variables. The coefficients of interest do not change appreciably between columns, so we will
focus on column 1. The marginal effect of each variable can be obtained by multiplying the
estimated coefficient times the q(X3) in the last row of the table. This is the amount by which
the probability of carrying a store brand varies with changes in X.
The main test of the bargaining effect of store brands is provided by the variable leading
brand market share, which has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of the retailer
25Variable N=1210 Mean Std Dev Mm Max
Store Brand .538 .499 0 1
Leading brand share 30.1 17.3 4.1 75.0
Category Revenue 6437.3 7147.1 19.8 26700.1
Squared Cat Rev 9.25E07 1.67E08 393.3 7.13E08
Ads/Sales leading brand .119 .336 0 2.63
Lowest Ads/Sales .189 .392 0 1
Highest Ads/Sales .207 .405 0 1
Ads/Sale*Brand Share 4.99 21.99 0 183.5
Number of Manufacturers 12.4 11.2 1 47
Manufacturers > 24 .137 .344 0 1
Manufacturers < 4 .191 .393 0 1
Consumers uncertain about quality 2.37 .409 1.31 3.24
Family Size 2.51 .481 1.67 2.89
Income 36328.8 5102.2 26677.4 42186.6
Non-white .208 .037 .148 .269
Age 48.4 4.82 42.3 55.4
Occupation .397 .102 .262 .535
Store Brand Market Share .076 .149 0 1
SB Market Share if > 0 (N=651) .142 .179 8E-06 1
Table 2: Summary statistics (store level observations)
Variable N=728 Mean Std Dev Mm Max
Store Brand in Chain .559 .4989 0 1
Leading brand share 30.1 17.3 4.1 75.0
Category Revenue 6519.4 7193.3 19.8 26700.1
Squared Cat Rev 9.42E07 1.68E08 393.3 7.13E08
Ads/Sales leading brand .120 .334 0 2.63
Lowest Ads/Sales .188 .391 0 1
Highest Ads/Sales .206 .405 0 1
Ads/Sale*Brand Share 4.98 21.81 0 183.5
Number of Manufacturers 12.4 11.1 1 47
Manufacturers > 24 .137 .344 0 1
Manufacturers < 4 .188 .391 0 1
Consumers uncertain about quality 2.37 .413 1.31 3.24
Family Size 2.54 .477 1.67 2.89
Income 34760.0 5272.3 26677.4 42186.6
Non-white .208 .043 .148 .269
Age 48.4 5.18 42.3 55.4
Occupation .374 .098 .262 .535
Table 3: Summary statistics (chain level observations)
26Store ohs % ohs
Store 1 146 12.07
Store 2 146 12.07
Store 3 142 11.74
Store 4 144 11.90
Store 5 145 11.98
Store 6 145 11.98
Store 7 72 5.95
Store 8 139 11.49
Store 9 131 10.83
Table 4: Number of Category-Years by Store
Chains ohs % ohs number stores
Chain A 146 12.07 1
Chain B 349 28.84 3
Chain C 281 23.22 2
Chain D 289 23.88 2
Chain E 145 11.98 1
Table 5: Number of Category-Years by Chain
introducing a store brand into the category. The marginal effect is a 0.4% increase in the
probability of the retailer carrying a store brand for every one percent increase in the share
of the leading national brand. For example, increasing a national brand share from 20% to
50% would increase the probability of a store brand in the category by 12%. This is an
economically meaningful effect and is the primary evidence we have for the importance to the
retailer of altering the balance of power with that brand. The result stands in contrast to
the previous literature. Raju et al. (1995) analyze the same dependent variable and find that
retailers introduce private labels into categories with more competition, or a greater number of
national brands. Since the number of national brands will be lower the larger the share of the
leader, all else equal, their result suggest the opposite of ours. Category revenue has a positive
and significant effect. This is consistent with economies of scale in store brand introduction;
larger categories attract more entry. The negative coefficient on the squared term implies that
attractiveness increases at a decreasing rate as the fixed cost of store brand introduction is
spread over more units. However, this result diminishes in significance in later regressions.
The advertising to sales ratio has a positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that
the categories with large margins between marginal and average cost are more profitable for
store brands. Raising the advertising to sales ratio from 0.5 to 1 (a large change in our data)
increases the probability of a store brand by about 15%. The attractiveness of a large margin
is further supported in the coefficient on lowest advertising to sales ratio, which is negative and
27significant. A retailer is 5% less likely to introduce a store brand in a category in which there is
essentially no wedge between marginal and average cost. The result does not support, however,
that national brand advertising is effective in discouraging consumers from purchasing store
brands.
The interaction between advertising to sales ratio and leading brand market share is strongly
negative and significant, as expected. A one standard deviation increase in this variable from
its mean value would decrease the probability of a store brand by 11%. Again, this reflects
the uneven effect of national brand advertising as reflected in subsection 4.1. If advertising is
sufficiently successful and consumers get utility from it, they will be less willing to purchase
the store brand.
Consumer preferences -asmeasured by our survey of MBA students -areimportant to
the introduction of store brands. If consumers who regularly purchase in the category are
unsure whether they can choose a quality product, the tendency to introduce store brands
is significantly lower; a one point increase on our scale translates into a 11% decline in the
probability of a store brand. Our certification conjecture suggests that consumers would trust
the store brand name and feel confident of purchasing the product. However, it appears that
the store brand name is not strong enough to overcome quality uncertainty; it requires national
advertising. Hoch and Banerji (1993) find that variability in private label quality reduces its
sales, a similar concept to the one we discuss here. Additionally, we cannot measure whether the
store brand has the name of the store written on it. To the extent that some of our categories
have private labels without the store name, we would not expect a certification effect to exist.30
The number of manufacturers in the category is positively related to the likelihood of store
brand entry, as expected. Five additional manufacturers increase the probability of a store
brand -conditionalon the leading brand's market share —by7%. However, the most populated
markets, those with 25 manufacturers or more, seem different. The dummy coefficient for those
markets is large and negative. Perhaps there is enough competition in these markets to render
a store brand unnecessary. Further work is necessary to fully understand why these markets
have a different tendency to include store brands.
The fixed effects for years, stores, and chains are also reported in the table; only those
for chains are significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on the year dummy for first
year indicates there is no statistically significant change in the average propensity to carry
store brands between the two years. The chain dummies correspond to one author's experience
30Dhar and Hoch (1997) include the variable, "does the store have a private label quality program," and find
that this predicts a higher level of private label sales. In our context, having such a program would make the
store more likely to introduce a private label, which would show up in the store or chain fixed effect. The effect
we find operates differentially across categories within a store.
28with the strategies of these supermarkets. Chain C is more likely to carry a private label
than Chain A, as is Chain B to a somewhat lesser extent. Chain D, however, is a somewhat
more upscale store and is less likely to have a store brand. Column 2 of the table runs the
same specification again, but this time includes demographics rather than fixed effects for
the stores. Larger families and higher incomes both discourage stores from carrying store
brands. Non-white residents, older residents, and consumers in higher occupational category
(our proxy for education) encourage the stocking of store brands. These demographic results are
consistent with previous results such as Dhar and loch (1997), except that they find non-white
consumers lower market share of store brands while we find that non-white consumers increase
the likelihood of a store brand in a category. As mentioned above, our family size measure is
very highly correlated with the presence of young children in the household. We conjectured
that parents might be risk-averse and purchase brands for the safety of their children, and
this is consistent with the empirical results. (Although it may instead be that children drive
demand by insisting on the cereal with Tony the Tiger rather than the store brand.) It is
interesting to note that a specification that includes both chain dummies and demographic
information results in no significant coefficients on those variables. It appears they are quite
collinear; this may be because chains have a store brand strategy and then choose locations
(consumer populations) compatible with that strategy.
Because only 6% of the observations show a different value of the dependent variable between
the two years, while our independent variables remain constant, we also run specifications for
each year separately. Table 7 on page 39 therefore repeats the regressions for each year of
observation. There are two minor differences between the two tables. Squared category revenue
and the lowest quintile of advertising lose significance at conventional levels, although the point
estimates remain steady. The years are a little asymmetric in that in the 1991 sample marginal
effects decline slightly, while in the 1992 sample, they rise for some coefficients. Our third table
of results (table 8 on page 40) examines the decision to carry a store brand at the chain level,
since this is likely to be the level at which credible threats can be made. We create a dependent
variable for this specification by assigning the chain a "1" if any store in the chain carries a
store brand in the category. The results are quite similar. The major differences are that the
significance of the advertising to sales variable drops to the 10% level in 1991 and becomes
insignificant in 1992. The interaction term also slips below conventional significance levels in
the 1992 sample, due to the point estimate falling somewhat. Of course, the sample size is
also considerably smaller in these specifications.3' In both specifications the market share of
31We also try creating a sample-wide average probability of stocking a store brand in a particular category
(N=82 in one year). Using ordinary least squares, we run the same specification on this dependent variable and
find the market share of the leading brand continues to have a positive and significant coefficient.
29the leading brand continues to have a statistically and economically significant impact on the
probability of carrying a store brand.
We know the number of UPCs in the category and one might think that this information
could be used to create some proxy for the extent of differentiation in the category, thereby
helping us measure one incentive to introduce a store brand. The problem is that categories vary
enormously by size (ad hoc definitions by IRI), so that the number of UPCs mostly measures
the size of category. In theory, even if the number of UPCs did measure the differentiation in a
category, it would provide no information on how tightly packed the category is, i.e how "close"
the closest substitute is to any given product. (We imagine that more products can "fit" in the
pre-sweetened cereal category than the sugar category and yet probably think different brands
of sugar are closer substitutes.) In addition, an argument along the lines of Sutton (1991)
suggests that advertising can reduce entry and perhaps therefore the number of UPCs in the
category. In fact, we find a negative relationship between the advertising to sales ratio and the
UPC measure in our data. If we include the number of UPCs in the regression, the marginal
effect of the share of the leading brand remains steady but the effects of category revenue and
advertising to sales variables decline, as expected. Since there is no good theoretical argument
for using this specification, we do not pursue it further.
Alternative explanations for evidence of store brands as bargaining tool
So far the discussion has focused on whether the empirical evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that store brands affect bargaining between manufacturers and retailers. However,
as discussed in section 4, we expect other forces also to shape the decision to carry a store
brand, particularly the opportunity to price discriminate and to earn higher price-cost margins.
A necessary question to ask is, therefore, does the incentive to introduce a store brand for price
discrimination or margin reasons increase with the market share of the leading brand?
To understand how leading brand market share might be related to the price discrimina-
tion motivation described in subsection 4.1, suppose that a large leading brand market share
indicated a large segment of consumers close to the location of the leading brand in horizontal
product space. By imitating the leading brand with a store brand the retailer could vertically
discriminate between consumers that differ in the utility that they derive from the brand as-
sociations created through advertising and in their aversion to unintentionally consuming a
low quality product. Then, conditionally on the retailer benefiting from higher total channel
profits, a larger market share of the leading brand would make selling a store brand more
worthwhile, given some fixed costs of introduction. This implies that store brand market share
after introduction should be increasing in the initial market share of the national brand. Per-
30haps the reason the national brand is the "leading" brand is because it got to the spot with the
best demand first. Hence the store brand may be imitating the national brands positioning to
maximize sales, not to improve bargaining terms.
To disentangle these motivations, we run a standard least squares regression using a different
dependent variable: store brand revenue share. If the retailer is simply entering those locations
in product space where imitation will generate the most sales, then high store brand market
share (in the category) should be correlated with leading national brand market share. The
results of the regression are reported in Table 9. Notice that the number of observations falls
because we are restricted to using categories in which there exists a store brand and therefore
share is greater than zero. The coefficient on the share of the leading national brand is small
and negative in both years. A high share for the leading national brand does not successfully
predict the share of its imitator, yet it does predict store brand entry. This combination of
results suggests that retailers must gain from stocking a store brand against a powerful national
brand, even when the store brand doesn't attract market share. These results fit nicely with the
predictions in our discussion of "efficiency in product choice" at the end of the model section on
page 15, namely that the market share of the store brand is a poor indicator for the strategic
importance of the store brand for the retailer.
Other coefficients change in the regression, as one would expect. The interaction term
becomes positive, since the sample contains only categories with a store brand. Conditional on
entry, those categories with a high leading brand share and also a high margin sell more store
brands. Low advertising categories also have high store brand share, presumably for the same
reason the store brand entered. Store brands appear to have difficulty gaining share in markets
where there are only a few manufacturers active in the market. This may reflect barriers to
entry such as intellectual property, perhaps requiring the store brand to take a lower quality
position. We obtain the same results if we run a more sophisticated specification than has
normally been used in the literature. The results from a Heckman selection procedure that
accounts for which categories get selected to have store brands is available from the authors
on request. Even when using category size and store dummy variables to identify the entry
of a store brand, leading national brand share fails to significantly predict store brand market
share.
Leading brand market share might also be related to the margin motivation described in
subsection 4.2. Suppose the leading brand had achieved its market position due to advertising
(an argument along the lines of Sutton (1991)). This implies that the leading brand's average
costs are substantially higher than its marginal costs of production, allowing the retailers
to achieve high price-cost margins with an (unadvertised) store brand. As a result, there
might be a positive relationship between margin and leading brand market share that is not
31directly causal, but works indirectly through advertising. A retailer might enter a category with
higher leading brand market share because the advertising necessary to achieve that market
share ensures a large gap between average and marginal cost. The empirical evidence does
not support this explanation. Since we can measure advertising to sales directly, the margin
motivation for carrying a store brand should be —andis —capturedby the coefficient of the
advertising to sales ratio, rather than by the coefficient of the leading national brand share.
Recall we include an interaction term between leading brand share and 'price-cost margin'
(as proxied by advertising to sales). A positive coefficient on this interaction term would be
evidence for a margin motivation that is enhanced by the share of the leading brand. In fact
we find the opposite. Markets with both high advertising to sales ratios ('margin') and high
leading brand shares are less likely to include store brands.
7Concludingremarks
In this paper we introduce a model that explains why a store brand can change the distribution
of profits between a retailer and national brand manufacturers in its category. We also provide
empirical evidence that the introduction of store brands by retailers is consistent with this
profit redistribution purpose rather than a demand-location motive. We find that retailers are
more likely to carry a store brand in a category if the share of the leading national brand is
higher, indicating that there is a bargaining motive for the introduction of the store brand.
Furthermore, the share of the leading national brand does not successfully predict the market
share of the store brand in the category.
We propose that this is because the retailer can position the store brand to mimic the leading
national brand. By improving the retailer's disagreement payoff, the store brand decreases the
incremental contribution of the leading national brand to category profits, thus allowing the
retailer to improve its supply terms with the manufacturer. These terms may or may not involve
promoting sales of the store brand. Our argument relies on the distinction between national and
store brands where store brands differ from other brands in being both unadvertised and located
at a position in product space that is determined by the retailer instead of by a manufacturer.
We confirm empirically that many store brands closely imitate national brands.
We also find empirical evidence that retailers can use store brands to price discriminate
among consumers and to exploit the marginal—average cost gap of national brands. Both lower
advertising and consumer concern about quality decrease the probability that a supermarket
carries a store brand. When both advertising to sales ratios and leading brand share are high,
however, store brand entry is discouraged, suggesting that image (or innovation) advertising is
effective. In addition, a retailer is more likely to carry a store brand in categories with larger
32revenues, indicating economies of scale to introducing a store brand. While these latter results
are consistent with the previous literature, our approach avoids the endogeneity problems found
in prior work, thus lending more credence to these findings.
We contribute to the store brand literature by introducing that retailers can strategically
position store brands in product space to strengthen their bargaining position when negotiating
supply terms with manufacturers of national brands.
We see three avenues for future research. First, due to data limitations we have not fully
exploited model predictions. For example, we do not derive detailed comparative statics on the
measures of horizontal and vertical differentiation. Also, we do not test our predictions about
incentives to introduce store brands as they relate to the retailer's bargaining power vis-a-vis
manufacturers. Second, our discussions with store brand managers suggest that store brands
rarely innovate in a product category, implying that the costs of introducing a store brand will
be lower if the product is one that can be easily imitated. Generally, one would expect that
more R&D intensive products will be more difficult to imitate, and therefore that these product
categories will be less likely to include a store brand. We were unable to obtain R&D data for
this project, but we believe that its addition would certainly enrich the empirical work. Lastly,
we would like to supplement our dataset with direct information on imitative packaging of store
brands.32 This would permit an exploration of the reasons behind a retailer's choice to create
a store brand that is an exact substitute for a national brand versus introducing a store brand
that is a differentiated or purposefully low-quality product.
32While the data on imitation shown in the introduction covers a subset of the same stores as our main dataset,
it was collected later than the sample period.
33APPENDIX
Total channel profit and joint profits
Simple maximization yields the following maximized profits nJ1 and ll where i, j{x, y, s}
and k,h E [1,2}.
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Lemma 2 Assume c E (i/2, i], s E (0, i), 'r(0, i). Then the following holds:
ll > ll (A-8)
ll > ll (A-9)
ll ￿ ll (A-iO)
-b-——>0 (A-fl)
Proof: Follow directly from the above derivations of maximized channel profit.
Claim 1 For all (ci, 'r, s) E fl' —fl< —fl.
—1— Proof: &omQ={o, '7, s0<y. —,0<s<i, i/2<c< i}itfollowsthat
fl1,1 —flu — S —-- and
—fl=. Theclaim holds by inspection. Q.E.D.
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dum store 2 -.3435
(.1756)
dum store 3 -.0273
(.1816)
dum store 5 -.2417
(.1687)
dum store 6 -.1909
(.1873)
dum store 7 -.2507
(.2079)
dum chain B .3601
(.1794)
dum chain C .715 1
(.1874)


















Pseudo fl2 0.3546 0.3239
Table 6: (White robust standard errors in parentheses)Existence of store brand, by year
1991 1992






































































Pseudo R2 0.338 0.318
Table 7: (White robust standard errors in parentheses)
39Existence of store brand anywhere in chain, by year
1991 1992































































(.6972) () .1362 .2416
Observations 366 362
Pseudo R2 0.345 0.316
Table 8: (White robust standard errors in parentheses)
40Store brand market share, by year
1991 1992






































































Table 9: (White robust standard errors in parentheses)
41